Beyond the Public and the Private : Thomas Spence and the Current Debate on Common Property by Cazzola, Matilde
 
Miranda
Revue pluridisciplinaire du monde anglophone /





Beyond the Public and the Private : Thomas Spence







Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès
 
Electronic reference
Matilde Cazzola, “Beyond the Public and the Private : Thomas Spence and the Current Debate on
Common Property”, Miranda [Online], 13 | 2016, Online since 17 November 2016, connection on 16
February 2021. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/miranda/9220 ; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/
miranda.9220 
This text was automatically generated on 16 February 2021.
Miranda is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0
International License.
Beyond the Public and the Private :
Thomas Spence and the Current
Debate on Common Property
Matilde Cazzola
 
The return of the commons
1 From  the  perspective  of  the  History  of  Political  Thought,  Modernity  is  the  age
characterized by the theorization of modern State, which is intimately linked with the
defence of private property. In Chapter V “On Property” of Second Treatise of Government
(1690), John Locke, the founding father of Liberalism, justified the individual exclusive
right to use a natural resource on the basis of the property in one’s person and in the
labour performed by one’s body. Locke also legitimized the right of appropriation and
accumulation  beyond  immediate  enjoyment,  introducing  the  use  of  money  (Locke,
285-302).  According  to  Locke,  the  emergence  from  the  state  of  nature  and  the
establishment of the State aimed at the protection of private property rights (Locke,
268) ; as a consequence, the revolution and dissolution of government were legitimate
when “the Legislators endeavour[ed] to take away, and destroy the Property of the
People”  (Locke,  412).  From  a  social-historical  perspective,  Modernity  cannot  be
considered  apart  from  the  beginning  of  capitalistic  accumulation  via  both  the
enclosure of common lands in Europe and the conquest of the New World. Both these
foundational events of modern age entailed a private appropriation of the commons–
unenclosed  and  undivided  lands  and  waters,  and  natural  resources  in  general,
collectively owned and amenable to common rights of pasture, piscary, and turbary.
Modernity  in  this  way,  both  from  an  intellectual  and  economic  perspective,  is
indissolubly linked with the privatization of the commons (Federici, 9 ; Linebaugh 2008,
46-47 ; Mattei 2011, 30-35). 
2 The commons were the main issue at stake in the political debates and struggles at the
dawn of Modernity, especially in England, where the Agricultural Revolution and the
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birth of agrarian capitalism affected them by unparalleled, massive enclosures from the
16th century onwards. These enclosures of land gathered momentum during the English
Revolution,  exciting  the  claims  of  the  radical  sect  of  the  Diggers  (Linebaugh  2008,
85-87). While for nearly two centuries this process took place mainly through informal
agreements,  starting  from  the  Inclosure  Act  1773  enclosure  by  Acts  of  Parliament
became the norm in Great Britain. However, with the complete unfolding of the logics
of privatization typical of Modernity embodied in these enclosures, the debate about
the commons faded. After many centuries of oblivion, the commons have resurfaced at
the core of radical political debates in the past few years, due to the fact that we are
currently facing the crisis  of  State sovereignty and the deployment of the logics of
neoliberalism in the form of large-scale privatization supported by public authorities.
In fact, as a consequence of the unprecedented strength both the private and the public
spheres are employing in their ceaseless assaults on the common bounties of the world
(such  as  forests,  water,  and  even  knowledge),  a  crisis  occurred  in  the  traditional
radical-left and Socialist critique of capitalism, which was founded upon the belief that
strengthening the State could solve the malfunctionings of the private sphere. Current
critics  of  capitalism  have  realized  that  the  State  has  gradually  been  losing  its
independence under the deployment of  globalizing processes and has,  in fact,  been
playing  a  leading  role  in  the  development  of  capitalism  as  the  very  supporter  of
privatising processes. For these reasons, today’s scholars have invoked the notion of
common property as a critical tool able to convey the necessity of creating a new space
of politics beyond both the private and the public spheres.
3 
Recent claims for the commons take on two main forms, according to the ways in which
the concept of common property is understood and the different entities referred to
when  the term  commonality  is  used.  The  first  version–exemplified  by  Commons.  A
Manifesto by Ugo Mattei and by The Magna Carta Manifesto. Liberties and Commons for All
by Peter Linebaugh–considers the commons as material and tangible wealth, and sees
Nature as their origin. Through this conceptualization, these scholars rehabilitate the
Diggers’ notion of the commons as natural bounties produced by the Earth, as lands to
till, water to drink, wood to carve, and fruits to gather. The second version, exemplified
by Commonwealth by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, does not focus only on Nature,
but rather on labouring society as the location where common property is created :
production processes are, for these scholars, the source of a wealth that, having been
produced in common, should therefore be enjoyed in common. Their lexical shifting
from  “commons”  to  “commonwealth”  not  only  implies  a  much  more  abstract  and
dematerialized concept of common property than the one taken into consideration by
the first version, but also conveys a total refusal of the logic of property implicit in the
discourses  about  “goods”  and  their  commitment  to  a  scheme  of  reorganization  of
society and production that emerges as the way of reimagining Communism today.1
4 In  spite  of  their  differences,  these  two  main  conceptions  of  common property  are
searching for a common ground of discussion and political action, both on a theoretical
and on a practical level. From this perspective, it is significant that on the occasion of
the  first  International  Festival  of  the  Commons  in  Italy  (Chieri,  July 9th-12th 2015),
organizer Ugo Mattei invited Antonio Negri, among other scholars and intellectuals.
The reason for this must be found in what these two conceptions share : the outline of a
third sphere of politics, that of common property, able to force us to overcome the
binary rhetoric  of private/public  and to  go  beyond the inconsistencies  of  both the
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market and the State.  For the first version, by virtue of them being vital and basic
sources of human subsistance, the commons must be based upon a collective and open
access incompatible with both private and public property. Private property is, in fact,
inconsistent with the commons since it is a “depriving power” (Mattei 2014, X), which
contains the dispossession upon which it is founded in its own etymology (from the
Latin verb prīvo, āre, which means “to bereave”). Moreover, if applied to the commons,
private property would imply commodification. However, the commons are, in their
essence, unavailable to become commodities : natural wealth, being unique, unable to
be reproduced, and having to give sustenance not just to the current but also to future
generations, must not be consumed, but mantained undamaged and intact. At the same
time,  the commons are  inconsistent  with public  property since,  for  their  collective
enjoyment, they reject any public authority’s attempt to control and govern them. The
commons  can  only  imply  management  from  below  which  acknowledges  no  other
sovereignty but the sovereignty of those who take part in their direct and collective
use. 
5 Also for the second version, the concept of common property rejects the notion of both
the private and the public spheres, since both the capitalists and the State represent
dangerous  agents  who  hinder  the  appropriation  of  wealth  on  behalf  of  those  who
produced it. For these thinkers, the commonwealth should be the form in which the
wealth is produced, appropriated, and enjoyed during and after production processes.
While both these versions see labour itself as a piece of the commons, the first focuses
on the  material  reality  of  producing  in  free  and dignified  conditions  (Mattei  2011,
53-54), and the second stresses the urgency of reappropriating the wealth produced,
proposing among other things the institution of an unconditional basic income as the
means for  carrying out  this  reappropriation and for  enjoying the fruits  of  labor in
common. This basic income would be an individual and continuous income thought as
an alternative to the Welfare State as a set of social  services granted by the public
sphere and liable to its fiscal crisis ; in this way, it would be a means of dismantling the
civilization of work and its basic logic, that sees wages as a necessary condition for
accessing the rights of full citizenship (Fumagalli, Vercellone). These scholars have also
theorized the notion of intellectual commonwealth : according to them, knowledge has
an  intrinsic  relational  nature  since  no  individual  can  generate  new  ideas  without
relying on the basis of common ideas and on intellectual communication with others
(Hardt & Negri, 303-04). The reappropriation of the commonwealth, for these thinkers
and activists, cannot be carried out by either some individuals or “the people” as a
homogeneous body of men confined by national boundaries, but by a multiethnic and
diversified “multitude,” which is the maker of the commonwealth and can be defined
as “the name of the poor” (Hardt & Negri, 39). From this perspective, the multitude is
not to be understood as the vast mass of the poor, but as all those gathered to form a
political body regardless of their rank or property ; it refers to a manifold and plural
group which, as property is irrelevant to qualify it, stands opposite to the State defined
by private property rights. This multitude constitutes a whole insofar as each member
is  subject  to  the  same  exploitation ;  nonetheless,  this  very  exploitation  does  not
produce uniform subjectivities, but multifarious ones. Even if it is the residual entity
left  after  the  violent  appropriation  historically  conduced  by  property  owners,  the
multitude is able to rise as a force of resistance recognizing itself as excluded from
wealth but included and exploited in production (Hardt & Negri, 52-53).
Beyond the Public and the Private : Thomas Spence and the Current Debate on C...
Miranda, 13 | 2016
3
6 In the following pages,  I  retrace the genealogy of  this  current debate by analyzing
Thomas Spence’s conception of common property. Spence emerges as a central figure
in this genealogical reconstruction since he was able not only to anticipate the main
issues at stake in today’s debate, but also to offer theoretical tools to overcome some of
the  limitations  of  this  debate,  insofar  as  he  considered  common  property  a
comprehensive  concept  which could affect  every aspect  of  reality–both Nature and
production.  He raised his  views of  the commons during the second half  of  the 18th
century, when the enclosures of land started being carried out by the State (Parliament
passed the first Inclosure Act when Spence was twenty-three years old) and the critique
of capitalism started taking the form of a proto-Socialist apology of the State and of
nationalization processes. However, in his critique of private property, Spence did not
emerge as an advocate of the State but, on the contrary, as the champion of common
property against both the pretenses of the capitalists and the impositions of the public
sphere. It is significant that his conceptualization anticipated the main issues of today’s
debate, which developed as a result of the crisis of the patterns of nationalization that
has  occurred  over  the  past  decades.  After  the  publication  of  his  Lecture by  Henry
Hyndman in 1882, it is not surprising that the current rediscovery of Spence’s thought
occurred, after a century of neglect, along with the beginning of the massive process of
privatization in the 1980s : in fact, the main contemporary editions of his writings (by
Dickinson and Gallop, both in 1982) were published in the early years of Thatcher’s
premiership, as if Spence’s thought was restored to curb neoliberal privatization. 
7 Retracing  the  genealogy  of  the  current  debate  on  common  property  through  the
analysis of Spence’s thought does not mean that this rereading of Spence makes sense
only  in  relation to  current  conditions :  instead,  it  derives  its  significance  from the
analysis of capitalist developments at Spence’s times. According to Spence’s thought,
the commons were a specific  conceptual  and pratical  tool of  struggling against  the
process of privatization at the beginning of Modernity, long before their resurfacing in
the last years.
 
The eccentric Modernity of Thomas Spence
8 Spence’s concept of common property is rooted in an interpretation of politics which
can  be  defined  as  eccentric  since  it  revolves  both  within  and  without  mainstream
modern political thought. The term “eccentric” is inspired by E. P. Thompson : in The
Making of the English Working Class, he wrote that “it is easy to see Spence…as little more
than  a  crank”  (Thompson,  161),  i.e.,  as  a  marginal  and  anachronistic  figure.  Here,
Spence’s eccentricity has a completely different meaning : it underlines his ability to
be, at the same time, a thinker who shared some of the main conceptions of modern
political  thought,  a  critic  of  capitalist  Modernity,  a  theorist  of  an  alternative
conception  of  Modernity,  and  a  forerunner  who  disclosed  some  of  the  issues  that
characterize  current  political  debate.  In  this  way,  if  one  looks  at  Modernity,  at  its
official  discourse and at modern power relations as a closed and centripetal  whole,
Spence can be seen as a vector of decentralization, willing to carry out a struggle from
within these relations in order to overcome and break the limits they set. In fact, his
thought,  after  having  developed  within  Modernity,  breaks  the  boundaries  of  fixed
modern thought in order to expand its meaning. 
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9 Spence’s notion of common property is the main feature of this eccentric positioning
within Modernity. It is also the main constitutive element of his Plan, i.e., his political
proposal  to  abolish  private  property  in  the  land  and  to  replace  it  with  common
management of the soil, by superseding the State apparatus with a decentralized parish
system.2 The abolition of a centralized State brings out Spence’s perspective that to
view land  as  common  property  cannot  be  equated  with  nationalizing  it.  Spence’s
eccentric position within modern political thought, suspended between early modern
claims and post-modern developments, can be analysed in light of his concept of land,
which is also essential in order to understand his notion of common property. Spence’s
starting point are the cries, raised in the 17th century by the Diggers, about Psalm 115 :
16 : “The heaven, even the heavens, are the Lord’s ; but the earth, hath He given to the
children  of  men”.  The  Diggers  claimed  their  “earth”  not  only  in  words,  but  also
through a radical act of reappropriation : on the first Sunday of April 1649, ignoring the
prescribed day of rest, they started digging the land of St. George’s Hill. Their collective
tillage of the soil conveyed a conception of the land as a set of material and natural
commons of which nobody could be legitimately dispossessed, and which necessarily
implied open, free, and collective enjoyment. In The True Levellers Standard Advanced
(1649), their spokesman Gerrard Winstanley confirmed this interpretation of the land
as a natural heritage : “In the beginning of Time, the great Creator Reason, made the
Earth  to  be  a  Common  Treasury,  to  preserve  Beasts,  Birds,  Fishes,  and  Man”
(Winstanley). 
10 However, in Spence’s writings, “land” not only refers to the soil and its agricultural
products, but also represents the “means of industry” (Spence, ed. Gallop, 82), i.e., the
springboard  for  new  forms  of  accumulation  typical  of  the  second  half  of  the
18th century. In fact, Spence’s “land” includes both natural areas and all locations of
human activity,  linking together under one single label  both the commons and the
commonwealth, both Nature’s and man’s production. In light of this broad definition of
“land” as both a natural resource and a location of human work, Spence writes :
All things which cannot be divided justly among a number of proprietors can be
enjoyed  with  the  nicest  exactness  in  partnership.  As  for  instance,  shipping,
collieries, mines, and many other great concerns (Spence, ed. Dickinson, 119).
11 Spence is therefore convinced that it is necessary to enjoy land in common, whether it
is used for primary subsistence or permanent production of wealth. In this way, his
thought does not confine the concept of  land to the old claims of  the Diggers,  but
confers to it a new meaning, characteristic of the transition to the industrial age. 
 
The Plan as the common property of the commons
12 Modernity emerged as the epoch of large-scale privatization, and Rationalistic thought
promoted a way of conceiving of reality as founded upon the distinction between the
private and the public spheres. Official political discourse presented private property
as the only property regime suitable for civilized mankind, and, from this perspective,
the commons were seen as the residual trace of the pre-modern world, the res nullius
that needed to be overcome (i.e., privatized) in the name of progress. Spence is deeply
aware of Modernity as an overarching process of privatization of common property :
talking  about  the  Recabites  in  Biblical  times,  he  writes :  “In  those  days…  it  seems
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engrossing  of  land  was  not  arrived  at  the  sublime  perfection  it  has  attained  to  in
modern days” (Spence, ed. Gallop, 164-65). 
13 The  last  ones  to  give  rise  to  a  powerful  controversy  on  the  commons  before  the
enclosures  reached  that  “sublime  perfection”  were  the  radicals  of  the  English
Revolution. Spence takes on their point of view–one typical of 17th century men–when
he writes : 
Our rich neighbours took it [the land] into their heads to inclose our common. Then
it was that you and I,  and many more poor people found a great alteration. We
could neither keep cow, nor sheep, nor geese as before. Every thing now depended
on the ready penny (Spence, ed. Gallop, 100-01).
14 What Spence is describing here is what happened in England at the dawn of Modernity :
the beginning of capitalistic accumulation (the “ready penny”) through privatization of
land and the end of the Ancien régime productive system founded upon the commons.
One of  the first  works written at  the very dawn of the process of  enclosure in the
16th century was Utopia (1516) by Thomas More. More based much of his criticism on
the enclosures of land carried out by the Church in order to breed cattle and make
profits,  and this is the reason why Spence considered Utopia as foundational for his
critique of privatization, praising More’s work for being “vastly opposite to the British
system”  (Spence,  ed.  Dickinson,  16).  This  process  marked  the  birth  of  agrarian
capitalism, the precondition of the Industrial Revolution, and corresponds to what in
1867  Marx  called  “primitive  accumulation  of  capital”  (Marx,  713),  i.e.,  the  process
which  created,  in  the  “prehistory”  of  capital,  the  foundation  of  the  capitalistic
relationship separating the labourers from the ownership of the conditions of labour.
Marx considers the beginning of this process to be the expropriation of rural labourers
and their expulsion from the land, thanks to draconian legislation and the violence
practiced by the State apparatus.  Anticipating Marx,  Spence considers violence and
coercion necessary to carry out this process and clearly sees the alliance between the
landlords’ private interests and the State’s authority in the operation of privatization.
Moreover, he sees primitive accumulation not only as a process of concentration and
expulsion,  but  also  as  an  expropriation–a  primitive  expropriation.  In  fact,  Spence
foresees capitalism as an incessant extraction and bereavement of  value.  From this
perspective,  embedded  in  his  argument  is  the  conception  of  capitalism  as
“accumulation  by  dispossession,”  theorized  by  David  Harvey  (Harvey,  63),  who has
recently defined both the modality of this accumulation–violence and predation–and
its outcome–dispossession. Spence anticipates this very conception, catching a glimpse
of capitalism as functioning to the detriment of  both natural  commons and human
labour : to him, the extraction of value from natural commons is the precondition of
the  extraction  of  value  from  the  wealth  produced  during  production  processes.
According to Spence, the landlords had at first “deprived the mothers of nature’s gifts,”
and secondly “pocketed the money” (Spence, ed. Gallop, 116), thus initiating a process
of  expropriation  and  accumulation  which  started  on  the  land  and  came  to  affect
society.  Anticipating  Harvey’s  and  Silvia  Federici’s  interpretation  of  primitive
accumulation  (Federici,  12),  Spence  thinks  that  violence  and  coercion  do  not
characterize only the primitive period of capitalistic accumulation (as Marx states), but
that they are actually a permanent aspect of it. In fact, “What was originally obtained
by the Sword, they determine to detain by the Sword” (Spence, ed. Gallop, 92). The
perpetuation  of  this  primitive  violence  was  once  and  for  all  formalized  and  made
official through the institution of the State, which subjected the labourers to a harsh
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fiscal and penal system : “Remember Richmond’s power ; To bind you neck and heels in
cord, Bastille you in the Tower” (Spence, ed. Dickinson, 125).
15 It is within this critique of “primitive accumulation” that Spence’s concept of common
property emerges. As in current debates, the commons are outlined at first through the
definition of what they are not. In fact, the commons are inconsistent with the two
modern property regimes par excellence, the private and the public ; this inconsistency
emerges  clearly  from  Spence’s  writings  through  a  precise  critique  of  both  private
property  and  the  State.  Spence  sees  private  property  as  a  pretense  founded  upon
robbery and on the exclusion of others who are prevented from experiencing the same
enjoyment. From this perspective, he states that landlords are but “public Robbers”
(Spence, ed. Gallop, 92), since their individualistic and self-serving plunder of land is
supported  by  public  authority.  Claiming  private  property  on  the  commons  is
illegitimate since it means claiming as private property all the individuals who live on
those lands :
Not an inch of land, water, rock, or heath, but was claimed by one or other of these
lords ; so that all things, men as well as other creatures, who lived, where obliged to
owe their lives to some or other’s property, consequently they too were claimed
(Spence, eds. Armstrong & Bonnett, 8). 
16 In this way, Spence’s notion of privatization anticipates not only Mattei’s “depriving
power,” but also what Linebaugh has recently called “excommunication” (Linebaugh,
2008, 271), i.e., the process of exclusion and estrangement from the commons that the
institution  of  private  property  entails.  In  this  regard,  Spence  often  underlines  the
status of “strangers” (Spence, ed. Gallop, 108) to which the former commoners were
reduced : since the State was the apparatus aimed at the protection of property rights
and the commoners had been deprived of the only form of property they owned, they
were de facto expelled from the right of citizenship. For Spence, the illegitimacy of land
being  considered  private  property  lies  also  in  the  commodification  that  every
privatization implies : since it coincides with the one market/State, the private/public
distinction results in the establishment of private property that automatically turns the
goods held as  private possessions into marketable goods,  i.e.,  commodities.  But the
commons are, for Spence, intrinsically unavailable to become commodities : for him,
every kind of exchange which trades in vital goods delegitimizes the market and opens
up  an  unscrupulous  commodification  of  the  world,  which  is  profitable  only  to  the
greedy desires of landlords. Spence realizes the extent to which the phrase “free trade”
conveys the existence of a market emancipated from any moral obligation : 
Must nothing be held sacred from Commerce ? No ! It seems not. But in order to
give free Scope to the Speculations of these People of Property all Bounds must be
thrown down and Every Thing must be vendable…In this manner Venality and the
Cursed Spirit of Traffic pervades Everything (Spence, ed. Gallop, 130). 
17 Spence’s critique of private property is foundational to his critique of the State. For
Spence, the central power is no less responsible for continuous assaults against the
commons  than  the  landlords,  whose  illegitimate  claims  are  always  supported  and
justified by public authority. Spence clearly sees the alliance between the public and
the  private  spheres :  the  State  is,  for  him,  instrumental  in  submitting  one  part  of
society to the other, since it is used as a tool of power by the landlords on the labourers.
Spence was deeply aware of the political consequences derived from the conceiving of
the State as a legal and institutional apparatus built to defend privatization and the
destruction of the commons : 
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The property is the nation…Which is saying that property is the public, and that the
public is property. And all things are ordered accordingly. For the laws are made by
property, and for property (Spence, ed. Dickinson, 98). 
18 Therefore,  public  property  and  private  property  are  not,  for  Spence,  two  opposite
property regimes, but two complementary forms of possession : they are two faces of
the same system of oppression and deprivation. 
19 The  property  regime  opposite  to  and  incompatible  with  both  public  and  private
property  is  common property.  Let’s  first  examine private  property.  To  Spence,  the
commons  are  intrinsically  anti-individualistic  and  inconsistent  with  any  kind  of
property which involves exclusion : “[The land], I do not give it to one, or two, or a
select few, but to you all…as a COMMON PROPERTY. You shall all be EQUAL OWNERS”
(Spence, ed. Gallop, 76-77). The commons’ inconsistency with private ownership is also
due to their unavailability to become a commodity. For Spence, a piece of the commons
would become a commodity only if reduced to an abstract object, separate from the
subjects who live on it ; but the commons, if reduced to this abstraction, would lose
their very essence. Indeed, Spence considers the commons as the absolute opposite of
commodities,  since  the  commons  are  founded  upon  intrinsically  anti-economic
considerations. Their exchange value is insignificant compared to their use value ; in
other words, their exchange value has to be minimized in order to have their use value
safeguarded. In light of this, we can grasp the meaning of Spence’s insistence on the
impossibility of selling and buying land after his Plan was implemented, to the extent
that he completely rejects the institution of small  landholdings (Spence,  ed.  Gallop,
142), preventing every business of profit and gain and every matter of money from
affecting the commons.
20 Now let’s examine State property. The commons do not need any State supervision to
be collectively enjoyed and they are beyond the attempt of any authority to control and
govern  them  from  above.  Instead,  they  require  management  from  below,  open  to
everyone on the basis of horizontal relations. The independence of the commons from
the State means,  for Spence,  independence from the limited temporality that every
human institution implies : more than legal rights, the commons are perpetuities. This
is why Spence always refers to timeless essences like God and Nature in his writings :
they  mirror  this  very  necessity  of  rooting  the  idea  of  the  commons not  in  human
history (or, even worse, in the history of the State), but in human beings.
21 The incompatibility of the commons with both private and public property also derives
from their relational and collective nature : in fact, in a common property regime, the
interests  of  each individual  are  satisfied only  with the interests  of  others,  and not
against them (as happens with private property) or regardless of them (as happens
with public property). It is precisely by virtue of their relational nature that knowledge
and  inventions  are  considered,  by  Spence,  as  a  piece  of  the  commons.  Intellectual
property as a part of the commons is a feature of surprising originality and foresight in
Spence’s thought. Moreover, it emerges as further proof of the fact that the notion of
common property  pervades  every aspect  of  Spence’s  meditation,  affecting not  only
material, but also immaterial, wealth. In A Further Account of Spensonia he writes : 
If any man possess an invention, or secret, in medicine, or other science, or art, or
importance to mankind, the state does not first tax the possessor by selling him a
patent…No : the parliament is obliged to purchase the secret, and publish it (Spence,
ed. Gallop, 90). 
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22 Spence’s call for the abolition of patents for those inventions that represent “blessings”
(Spence, ed. Gallop, 90) for humanity and for their organized propagation depicts him
as a forerunner of the current notion of “copy-left,” i.e., the idea of the breaking down
of  the  barriers  of  the  right  of  intellectual  property  and the evasion from its  strict
regulations. For Spence, the patent is a symbol of private knowledge (and, as such it is,
used to deprive others of knowledge itself). Therefore, it is necessary to escape from
the regimentation of patents in the name of common interest. For Spence, knowledge is
intrinsically  relational  since confrontation among individuals  is  indispensable to its
production,  whereas  the privatization of  information and inventions hampers  their
propagation and curtails general innovation.
23 Also  Spence’s  reform  of  English  pronunciation3 (the  invention  of  the  so-called
“Crusonian Alphabet”) can be viewed in the same perspective of common property :
Spence knows that while language should be a commonwealth, since it is commonly
spoken and listened to, large portions of it are subject to complex grammatical and
phonetic rules that make them inaccessible to the main body of the people and that can
be construed not  only  as  privately  appropriated but  also  as  publicly  imposed.  This
control  is  aimed at  regulating access to the linguistic  skills  necessary to social  and
economic inclusion. Spence sees discrepancies between spelling and pronunciation as a
by-product of social inequality : in this way, the alphabet emerges as a tool of command
by one part of society over another. With his Crusonian reform, Spence purports to
make  it  possible  for  every  social  group  to  reappropriate  its  own  means  of
communication and redistribute the communicative power of language : 
I cannot but think it possible such a method of spelling may take place, especially
among the laborious part of the people, who generally cannot afford much time or
expence in the educating of their children (Spence, 1775).
 
The Plan as a reappropriation of the commonwealth
24 When  Spence  started  writing  in  the  second  half  of  the  18th century,  the  term
“commonwealth” already had a long history. According to Hobbes, the Commonwealth
was the State–in its etymological sense of a fixed, steady, and motionless entity–while
Harrington described the Commonwealth of Oceana (1656) as a Republic, a political form
which did not imply the neutralization of the natural movement of politics represented
by the State.  But Spence’s  notion of  commonwealth is  of  a different sort.  From his
perspective,  it  is  a  form  not  only  of  political  organization,  but  also  and  most
importantly of social organization, to be understood in its etymological sense as the
wealth produced in common by society and which men must enjoy in common against
any private or institutionl attempt to exercise control over it.
25 For  Spence,  this  common  enjoyment  coincides  with  the  reappropriation  of  the
commonwealth. This reappropriation will take place via the system of dividends first
enunciated by Spence in the ballad The Rights of Man published in 1783. Spence explains
that rents would have to be paid by parish inhabitants for the tillage of the land, and
after having paid all administrative expences, the remaining two-thirds of the rents
would be the dividends, i. e., the shares that were to be redistributed quarterly and
equally “among all the living souls in the parish, whether male or female ; married or
single ; legitimate or illegitimate ; from a day old to the extremest age” (Spence, ed.
Gallop, 119). Since the money redistributed in the form of dividends would derive from
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the rents paid for tilling the land, and since in their turn the rents would be paid with
the money earned by the  work of  each individual,  once this  money was  shared as
dividends, it would imply a redistribution of the wealth of society among those who
produced it. Spence writes in The End of Oppression : 
The Landed Interest…is literally paid for nothing but to create Masters. – I say only
think  of  all  this  Money,  circulating  among  the  People,  and  there  promoting
Industry and Happiness” (Spence, ed. Gallop, 96). 
26 The “creation of Masters” mentioned here can be overcome by “circulating” in society
the wealth that until then was subdued by a logic of private expropriation :
The perpetual influx of wealth by their Rents without toil or study, leaves them at
full Liberty and Leisure to plot, and supplies them also with the means of fighting
successfully against the interests of the working part of the Community, and turn
their labours to their own advantage (Spence, ed. Gallop, 93).
27 Therefore,  what  Spence demands is  an inversion in  the direction of  this  “influx of
wealth” from exploiters to producers ;  only thus will  the landlords’ revenue change
from a means of dominion over society into an instrument of emancipation of society
from dominion. Here, Spence does not perform a critique of revenue, as any other left-
wing  radical  would.  Rather,  he  carries  out  a  powerful  critique  of  the  private  and
individualistic appropriation of revenue : the rents paid by the tenants to the landlords
are revenue, i. e., income arriving continuously and without toil or costs in landlords’
pockets.  The landlords,  using this revenue for individual  and private purposes,  had
historically been able to make it an instrument of social command and of illegitimate
appropriation of the labourers’ work. In this sense, even the redistribution of Spence’s
dividends would be a fulfillment of revenue. However, having been released from its
former private purpose, this revenue would cease to be used as an instrument for the
perpetuation of social inequality. Instead, the dividends would produce a socialization
of the revenue, becoming a commonwealth and turning from a means for the few to
dominate the many, into an instrument of emancipation of the many from the few. As
Spence writes : “This would…be…a continual flow of permanent Wealth established by a
System of Truth and Justice” (Spence, ed. Gallop, 96). 
28 Spence’s proposal of  distributing dividends shows more than an element of kinship
with  the  current  movement  asking  for  unconditional  basic  income.  In  particular,
Spence seems to anticipate the most radical way of conceiving of unconditional basic
income : an income independent from age, sex, employment, civil status, penal charges,
and even from citizenship. While it is true that only parishioners have access to the
dividends, citizenship is conceived of by Spence as an open condition, since anyone
dwelling in a parish for a year automatically becomes a citizen and is as such entitled to
parochial  shares.  However,  Spence’s  redistribution of  dividends seems closer to the
logic  of  universal  revenue  than  to  that  of  universal  income :  his  dividends  would
represent a “continual flow of permanent wealth” owed to everyone “without toil or
study”.  The  dividends  would  not  depend  on  individual  employment,  since  no
unemployed individual would be debarred from redistribution. In this way, the system
of the dividends would be what we could call unconditional basic revenue. However,
with  no  contradiction,  the  dividends  would  also  represent  the  necessary
reimbursement owed to the working society meant as a collective body : 
All riches come from society, I mean the labouring part of it. And when all these
improvements  return back to  society,  they  will  only  return to  the  source  from
whence they came (Spence, ed. Dickinson, 120). 
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29 In this way, having at its core dividends as a system for the reappropriation of revenue,
the  Plan  itself  would  be  a  project  of  reappropriation  and  redistribution  of  the
commonwealth. This reappropriation would have an intense emancipating function. In
fact, Spence’s main purpose appears to be the fullfilment of individual and collective
freedom  on  the  basis  of  equality–which  is  meant  not  as  a  levelling  of  economic
conditions,  but  as  an  absence  of  social  and  political  command.  In  this  way,  the
dividends would have a social, rather than a merely economic function : the purpose of
the Plan is not the removal of economic differences (since commonality would affect
only  land  and  not  movable  possessions),  but  rather  the  abolition  of  the  negative
outcomes of these very differences on freedom and equality, i.e., social inequality and
political hierarchies.
 
The agent of the reappropriation : the “swinish
multitude”
30 Anticipating Hardt and Negri, Spence considers the multitude as the political subject
who has to become the agent of the reappropriation of the commonwealth. In fact,
those  to  whom Spence addresses  his  ideas  and with whom he fosters  his  fight  are
neither individuals considered singularly nor “the people” meant as a homogeneous
body of subjects/citizens. On the contrary, Spence is referring to the members of the
“swinish multitude” : the poor and differentiated fourth estate who fell victim to the
privatization of the commons at the dawn of Modernity. Spence drew this phrase from
Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the French Revolution (1790). But while Burke considered
the multitude with contempt, as the lowest social group threatening the stability of
established order, Spence polemically recovered “swinish multitude” with a positive
meaning.  Spence’s  multitude  can  be  compared  to  the  image  of  the  “Many-Headed
Hydra”  conceived  of  by  Peter  Linebaugh  and  Marcus  Rediker  (Linebaugh,  Rediker,
2000). In fact, the Spencean multitude has a Hydra-like nature, insofar as it emerges as
a radically plural and open political subject, embracing all those who, on both sides of
the  Atlantic,  work  and  toil  under  the  command  of  the  capital  and  resist  it  with
instances of  emancipation in manifold and multifarious ways.  Spence’s  multitude is
multiethnic,  since  it  includes  not  only  British  poor,  but  also  native  Americans  and
African slaves. Spence writes that, under the Plan, “the warlike Indians” as well as “the
slaves  and  disenfranchised  labourers  of  other  nations  would…find  emancipation”
(Spence, ed. Dickinson, 44). He also “beg[s] to be understood as laying down a system of
government for the free-born, unshackled minds of the North American and African
savages” (Spence, 1792, 1). The European, African, and American members of Spence’s
Atlantic  “swinish  multitude”  share  the  same  creative  force :  “The  earth  has  been
cultivated  either  by  slaves  compelled…  to  labour,  or  by  the  indigent”  (Spence,  ed.
Gallop, 121-22) ; likewise, “slaves and unfortunate men have cultivated the earth…and
filled it with all kinds of riches” (Spence, ed. Dickinson, 120). But they also share the
same revolutionary potentiality : “As often as such periodical revolutions happened in
favour of the Rights of Man, they… were procured by the irresistible importunities of
the slaves and the landless men” (Spence, ed. Gallop, 69).
31 Spence’s multitude is not defined by its nationality : instead, its status as a “stranger”
(Spence, ed. Gallop, 108) is often stressed by Spence. From this perspective, the fact
that the multitude lives in a country entirely possessed by others and must ally with
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the oppressed of  other nations foreshadows the internationalist  outline of  Marxian
proletariat.  Moreover,  Spence  conceives  of  the  fulfillment  of  his  Plan  on  an
international scale : “My plan…is as well calculated for any nation under the Heavens”
(Spence,  ed.  Gallop,  158).  Nevertheless,  compared  to  Marx’s  proletariat,  Spence’s
multitude preserves a heterogeneity and an inner diversification that wouldn’t have
been  familiar  to  the  Marxian  conception  of  the  working  class.  In  fact,  as  if
foreshadowing current debates, Spence considers the multitude as a concept able to
express, at the same time, the multiple subjectivities involved in the struggle and the
coordination of their common action. Spence’s multitude has a collective nature (which
is the precondition of its collective action) because of the common coercion it suffers.
However,  at  the  same  time  (being  the  opposite  of  “the  people,”  which  is  a
depersonalizing concept),  it  does not imply any nullification of  the subjectivities at
stake, which are anti-individualistic (since they are not defined by private property
rights)  but  preserve  an  individual  dimension.  As  the  producer  and  the  legitimate
caretaker of the commonwealth, the Spencean “swinish multitude” can be described
with Hardt and Negri’s definition, “the name of the poor.” The meaning that Spence
ascribes to poverty in reference to the multitude is not obvious :  the poverty of his
multitude does not necessarily point out to a condition of real need, but denotes all
those who gather to form a political body regardless of their possessions. Finally, in
spite of its constitutive plurality, the multitude can, for Spence, organize and acquire a
synchronous and revolutionary movement, managing to destroy the old system and
establish a brand new political order : “For in a mass, like a flood o’er they pass, They’ll
sweep all their [the landlords’] greatness away” (Spence, ed. Dickinson, 128). 
 
The management of the commonwealth : the end of
poverty
32 The system of  dividends  involves,  for  Spence,  the  establishment of  a  decentralized
administrative apparatus which emerges as an alternative form of social organization
in lieu of the modern State. This apparatus is assigned to the management of society
and has as its first purpose the administration of the poor. In this way, Spence’s project
of societal management is envisaged primarily as a fight against poverty. 
33 As part of the wide debate on the Poor Laws which developed in Britain between the
18th and 19th centuries, Jeremy Bentham wrote the Essays Relative to the Subject of the Poor
Laws (1796),  where he distinguished poverty from indigence :  while the poor had to
work in order to survive, the paupers were either unable to survive on their meagre
wages or  unable  to  work altogether (Bentham, ed.  Quinn,  3).  It  will  be  shown that
Spence’s redistribution of dividends would not only grant everyone enough to live on
(thus putting an end to the paupers’ condition), but would also remove the necessity of
working in order to have access to these means (de facto eliminating the Benthamian
poor  as  well).  The  overall  purpose  of  the  fight  against  poverty  as  conceived  of  by
Spence derives from his notion of poverty itself.
34 In fact,  in Spence’s thought,  poverty emerges as a political  concept with a peculiar
meaning : poverty is mainly a social and not an economic condition, the opposite of
which is not abundance of wealth and goods, but social equality and freedom. In this
way, in Spence’s writings, the term “poverty” is semantically quite broad, referring not
only to the paupers and the indigent, but to all those who, because of many kinds of
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dispossession, are not free to make their own decisions regarding their own existence,
and are subjected to social and political command. Therefore, the poor derive their
condition from the fact that they are forced and constrained in and by a system which
does not allow the lower classes to control their own lives according to their will and
inclinations (Spence, 1795). Since the poor, under their many guises, would be able to
overcome this lower social condition by the establishment of Spence’s Plan and by his
redistribution of dividends, the Plan itself can be considered a system of Welfare avant
la lettre, whose implementation does not depend on a centralized State, but on the local
administration.  From  this  perspective,  Spence  states  that  the  redistribution  of
dividends, as it does not involve central power but parochial management, would imply
the “very little influence” (Spence, ed. Gallop, 126) of the government : therefore, not
only does the system of dividends not descend from any central government, but, for it
to be effective, it is necessary to do away with government altogether. 
35 The sharing of dividends would guarantee everyone the basic means of subsistence,
thus allowing the paupers to overcome their former miserable condition. In fact, after
the Plan is implemented, the situation would be incomparably improved from the one
that  prevailed  beforehand,  when  shortage  of  economic  means  coincided  with
indigence. Moreover, if the system of dividends were established, it would emancipate
the poor from poverty as a condition of deprivation that made them prey to coercion,
thus ending not only indigence, but poverty itself in the broadest sense, as explained
above. So, not only would beggars and starving men be granted a decent existence, but
the condition of all those who were formerly not free to make decisions about their
lives (for economic, social, or even intellectual reasons) would disappear. Since each
individual would keep all the movable goods he or she used to own before the Plan was
enforced, there would still be those who have more and those who have less ; but these
merely economic differences would cease to produce social  and political  inequality.
Therefore, after implementation of the Plan, no individual would find him- or herself
with no alternatives in life.
36 In this way, the first result of Spence’s Plan is to support the paupers, who “from the
vices and miseries of hopeless grovelling poverty, would at once be elevated to the
virtues, consequence, and happiness of mediocrity” (Spence, ed. Dickinson, 56). After
having “delivered…the Indigent from their… Misery by abolishing the Causes” (Spence,
ed. Gallop, 163),  the Plan would overcome the condition of exploitation and lack of
independence of the poor in general. From this perspective, Spence writes that under
his system, “the poor would have the advantage every way and might turn to what
calling  they  liked  without  compulsion”  (Spence,  ed.  Claeys,  320).  In  fact,  the
redistribution  of  dividends  would  also  increase  social  mobility,  by  allowing  each
individual to improve his or her condition by his or her own exertions. In fact, with
respect to the labourers, Spence states that 
Such also as aspired to become masters would have an opportunity of saving money
for that purpose. It would not be as now, once down and aye down. No, there would
then be a possibility of rising again (Spence, ed. Dickinson, 56).
37 In this way, poverty in its broadest sense would be extinguished. Therefore, when in his
writings, Spence mentions the poor even after the establishment of the Plan, it is clear
that he means a different kind of poverty than that which existed before the Plan :
while  poverty  before  the  Plan  was  a  never-ending  condition  of  deprivation  and
suffering,  poverty  after  the  Plan  would  no  longer  produce  social  and  political
hierarchies. Poverty after the Plan would coincide with a small availability of money,
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but  it  would  never  jeopardize  the  means  of  sustenance ;  moreover,  it  would  be
temporary, since the sharing of dividends would allow everyone to recover : “So if by
Sickness or Mischance To Poverty some wane, Their Dividends of Rents will come To set
them up again” (Spence, 1783, 106).
38 The  system  born  from  the  Plan  would  allow  everyone  to  achieve  a  virtuous
“mediocrity” (Spence, ed. Gallop, 148). On the one hand, this term is reminiscent of
classical mediocritas : in The Restorer of Society, Spence writes that “Mediocrity of Wealth
has  always  been  found  to  be  the  never  failing  source  of  Knowledge,  Good  Taste,
Industry and Happiness, and of all the virtues” (Spence, ed. Gallop, 148). On the other
hand,  in  Spence’s  thought  “mediocrity”  has  a  strong  implication  of  social  equality
unparalleled in ancient authors. This improvement of economic conditions would be
far from being, as it was for the Calvinists, a social divider, splitting the elects and the
damned on the basis of their economic differences. On the contrary, Spence’s system
would give each and everyone a chance, thanks to the redistribution of dividends :
The houses and everything about them are so amiably neat…that they seem the
habitations  of  rational  beings ;  of  beings  worthy  the  approbation  of  the  Deity,
because, though as he designed them they be lords of all his works, they presume
not be Lords of each other (Spence, ed. Gallop, 87).
39 Here, Spence is mimicking the core of Puritan ethics (economic ease as the outer sign of
God’s  approval)  in  order  to  assert  the  opposite.  In  fact,  he  is  saying  that  the  real
opportunity for everyone to achieve social “mediocrity” after the Plan would seem to
fulfill Calvinist doctrine, making the world as if men had derived their wealth from a
divine  predilection.  But  there  is  nothing more  remote  from Spence’s  thought  than
Calvinist  discourse,  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  generalized  “mediocrity”  which
would be achievable under Spence’s system is open to everyone, while Puritanism is
founded upon the co-existence of the election of the wealthy and the damnation of the
poor : the two conditions implicate each other, and poverty must exist for the doctrine
itself to work. Instead, Spence’s “mediocrity” has to be understood as an absence of
social and political hierarchies : what matters most is that men cannot be “lords of each
other” any longer.
 
Beyond the civilization of work 
40 The other issue around which Spence sketches out the emancipation produced by the
system of dividends is labour, which is strongly connected to poverty. I have shown
that, before the establishment of the Plan, labour is characterized by “accumulation by
dispossession.” In fact, for Spence the division of society between the rich and the poor
is founded upon a dynamic relation of oppression and resistence between “the spoilers
and the spoiled” (Spence, ed. Gallop, 116), which manifests itself in labour relations.
Therefore, work as an abstract concept typical of Liberal discourse is turned by Spence
into the concrete toil of the labouring classes, emerging as a dimension of encounter
and  conflict,  a  real  battlefield  where  the  struggle  for  the  appropriation  of  wealth
between legitimate and illegitimate owners occurs. 
41 Spence indicts the landlords (and the organization of work they established) not only
for dispossessing the labouring class, but also for condemning them to restless work
that deprives them of free time. Therefore, the labourers are doubly dispossessed, both
of wealth and of time. Time is, for Spence, a matter of freedom : free time, being the
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time of individual regeneration, represents a dimension of freedom that every labourer
is  entitled  to.  From  this  perspective,  in  The  Restorer  of  Society,  Spence  shows  the
appropriation of wealth and time by the landlords as two sides of the same strategy of
dispossession :
When the People began to talk of Keeping Holiday…So instead of allowing them
Holidays he increased their Tasks…Our Taskmasters because we talk of Liberty take
care  to  manage  matters  so  that  we  should  be  closely  employed  and  instead  of
working only six Days a Week we are obliged to work at the rate of Eight or Nine,
and yet can hardly subsist (Spence, ed. Gallop, 132).
42 In this way, the institution of dividends would represent the reappropriation of both
wealth  and  time.  So  not  only  would  Spence’s  Plan  emancipate  labourers  from
exploitation and dispossession, but it would also free man from any control which the
State and the group of capitalists had formerly tried to impose on him by coercion to
work. On the one hand, after the Plan, the working conditions would be overhauled,
since  all  forced  and  exhausting  labour  would  cease.  This  would  produce  an
emancipation of work from the conditions that had formerly characterized it : after the
Plan, “industry will  be relieved of the almost insurmountable fetters of the present
hour” (Spence, ed. Dickinson, 20). However, on the other hand, the Plan would also
produce an emancipation of man from work : under the new system, work would no
longer be a compulsion. In fact, even though Spence writes that “[there] would be no
other than to live as  sober,  industrious citizens,  mantained by their  own industry”
(Spence,  ed.  Gallop,  73),  he  does  not  share  the  ethics  of  indefatigable  work :  his
statement  addresses  all  those  who  never  were  sober  and  industrious,  i.  e.,  the
landlords. Instead, he denounces the hypocrisy of Puritan rethoric of restless labour,
unmasking landlords’ self-serving purposes : “You may then guess the Cause why all
this outcry is about work, for well they know that some People must labour to uphold
such a shameful mass of Extravagance and Idleness” (Spence, ed. Gallop, 133).
43 The  Plan  would  provide  the  genuine  possibility  of  free  individual  choice  as  to  the
amount of time one wanted to work, and would produce a new system different from
the  constant  requirement  of  ceaseless  work,  to  which  the  birth  of  capitalism  had
doomed the  lower  classes.  In  fact,  starting from the “primitive”  expulsion of  rural
labourers from the lands in the 16th century, a mutation and a deterioration in the
condition of the poor occurred :  former commoners were made “proletarians” who,
being dispossessed of the commons, by then did not own anything but their offspring
and the product of their toil (Linebaugh, 2008, 65). Under Spence’s Plan, the conditions
of the poor would be very different. Everyone would be responsible for his or her own
earnings :
Where would be the great harm if some Men should but perform half their ordinary
work if they be content with half wages or half gains ? ...There would be Enough of
Work done for the happiness of Society though Men should not be always toiling
like Slaves (Spence, ed. Gallop, 132). 
44 Under the new parochial  system, one would work to live,  not live to work. In fact,
everyone would work (rather, every social group would work), but everyone would do
it freely, and this absence of coercion would allow every man or woman to decide not
only for how long to work, but also whether he or she wants or needs to work. The only
social duty imposed by the parish administration would be the payment of the rent to
till the land : anyone who would not have to work to pay it (as movable goods would
not  be  held  in  common),  would  be  free  not  to  work at  all.  Work would no  longer
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represent an obligation ; in this way, the dividends, overcoming work as a necessary
condition  for  an  income,  would  abolish  the  necessity  of  work  itself.  From  this
perspective, as I have shown, the system of dividends would produce a transition from
a civilization of wages to a civilization of revenue : while salary is intrinsically linked to
the work performed in order to earn it, revenue is independent from work. In this way,
income would cease to coincide with wages, which everyone had previously had to earn
with incessant toil, and would become revenue, a right simply derived from citizenship.
In this way, while wages were formerly a necessary condition to access citizenship,
after the Plan was implemented, citizenship itself would give access to an income–or,
even better, to a revenue.
45 Therefore, after the Plan, the emancipation of man from work would imply an increase
in  free  time,  as  a  creative  and  autonomous  reappropriation  of  one’s  individual
existence. From this perspective, consider that while the French Jacobins in the French
Revolutionary Calendar (1792) had lengthened the week into “decade” (ten-day week) in
order to have nine days of work against just one of leisure, Spence in The Constitution of
Spensonia shortened the week to five days (Spence, ed. Gallop, 184), in order to increase
man’s free time, thus repudiating the Jacobins’ commitment to work. The importance
of rest is stressed in The Constitution of a Perfect Commonwealth, where Spence writes that
Spensonians (the citizens of Spensonia, Spence’s utopian island) should be granted the
right to “be hospitable to one another, to entertain a friend, to relax a little now and
then from incessant labour” (Spence, ed. Dickinson, 56) : in this system, the more free
time would also contribute to the renovation of social relations. 
46 In this way, earlier dispossession would be turned into reappropriation, and earlier
exploitation  into  cooperation.  Spence,  according  to  the  logic  of  common  property,
reconsiders  not  only  the  enjoyment  of  the  wealth  produced,  but  also  its  very
production : he outlines a cooperation which has to be understood as work performed
in common, but without any implication of collectivism, which would bring Spence’s
discourse back to the logic of  the centralized State. In fact,  in one of his letters to
economist Charles Hall, Spence criticizes Hall’s proposal of social trasformation since it
“makes  every  kind  of  Property  the  Property  of  the  Nation,”  thus  producing
nationalization, and obliges the labourers to “work under Gang Masters” (Spence, ed.
Claeys, 320), thus producing collectivism. Spence’s Plan, on the contrary, would at the
same time liberate work and free men from work–a freedom based upon variety and
difference, and not upon the homogeneity collectivism implies. 
47 Therefore, Spence’s Plan and his concept of common property represent a new order
which  goes  beyond  the  civilization  of  work,  appearing  much  earlier  than  the
development of advanced industrial society and the deployment of the very logics of
the  civilization  of  work.  The  Plan  itself  emerges  as  a  pattern  foreshadowing  an
alternative idea of society, where wages would cease to represent the tool of command
of the few over the many, and where everyone, enjoying the fruits of his or her own
labour, would no longer be employed by a master but would work for him- or herself :
There  would  be  no  occasion  for  Gang-masters…to  make  People  till  their  land
properly…In  so  prosperous  a  State  as  this,  there  would  be  few  Labourers  or
Journeyman  in  any  Line  of  Business.  It  would  be  little  Farmers  and  little
Mastermen…And  where  Prodigality  or  Mischance  did  not  prevent  those  hiring
themselves might soon be above such Necessity (Spence, ed. Claeys, 320).
48 This  image  of  an  alternative  society  is  not  far  from  what  radical  movements  are
proposing today, at the end of Modernity : a “transformation of labour through labour”
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where work itself could become “the foundation not of the establishment of private
property but of its abolition,” in light of the deployment of new “equilibriums able to
secure the production by man for man” (Negri).
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NOTES
1. Worthy of mention although slightly different from Hardt and Negri’s conception is the idea of
common property recently expressed in the massive work by Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval:
Commun. Essai sur la révolution au XXIe siècle. Similar to the authors of Commonwealth, Dardot and
Laval believe that commun is a “political principle,” which originates only from a common action
(Dardot,  Laval,  15).  However,  different  from  Hardt  and  Negri,  they  stress  the  political  and
juridical features of commun to the detriment of the material, social, economic, and productive
dimension, which is at the core of Hardt and Negri’s analysis. 
2. Spence’s Plan was first presented at the Newcastle Philosophical Society in 1775 in a lecture
titled  Property  in  Land  Every  One’s  Right.  Its  main  contents  remained  basically  unchanged
throughout the many pamphlets and poems, which Spence wrote in the following forty years.
However, the term “Plan” did not appear till 1782, in A Supplement to the History of Robinson Crusoe,
where Spence started naming it so, replacing the terms “prospect” and “method” appeared in his
first lecture (Spence, eds. Armstrong & Bonnett, 9-11).
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3. See Joan Beal’s article in this collection for more information on that topic. 
ABSTRACTS
The purpose of this article is to show the concept of common property of Thomas Spence
(1750-1814) as a genealogy of the current political debate about the commons. This debate is
characterized by two main ways of  conceiving of  common property :  one that  considers  the
commons  as  a  material  heritage  produced  by  Nature,  and  one  that  focuses  on  labour  and
proposes the concept of commonwealth for the wealth produced during production processes.
Spence’s Plan reconciles the differences between these two versions of common property :  in
fact, being a project for the reappropriation of both the commons and the commonwealth, the
Plan offers the conceptual tools to help overcome the limitations of the current debate.
L’intention de cet article est de présenter le concept de propriété commune de Thomas Spence
(1750-1814) comme une généalogie du débat politique actuel à propos des biens communs. Ce
débat  est  caractérisé  par  deux  manières  différentes  de  concevoir  la  propriété  commune :  la
première qui considère les biens communs comme patrimoine matériel produit par la nature, et
la deuxième qui se concentre sur le travail et propose le concept de commun pour signifier la
richesse produite au cours de procédés de production. Le Plan de Spence concilie les différences
entre ces deux versions de la propriété commune : en effet, étant un projet de réappropriation
aussi bien des commons que du commonwealth, le Plan offre les outils conceptuels pour dépasser
les limites du débat contemporain.
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